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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/07/2011 Accident number: 773 
Accident time: 09:05 Accident Date: 25/08/2007 
Where it occurred: AF/0102/00347, 
MF0056, Chinar 
Village, Dehsabz 
District of Kabul 
Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: None 
ID original source: (26) Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded) Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 19/07/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
Inadequate detector pinpointing 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons 
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting 
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more 
information becomes available. 
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The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF DEMINING ACCIDENT OCCURRED ON [Demining 
group] DT- 01 ON 25 AUGUST 2007  
INTRODUCTION:  
An investigation team by the Area Manager of AMAC Centre (Kabul) and a BOI by the Chief 
of Operations were convened to investigate the demining accident involving [the Victim] a 
deminer from [Demining group] DT- 01. The accident occurred at 09:05 hours on 25 August 
2007 at task # AF/0102/00347, MF0056 located in Chinar village, Dehsabz district of Kabul 
province.   
SUMMARY: 
The mentioned task is part of SHA # 4 of impacted community #1079 which is contaminated 
by AP mines. The clearance of the task was started by [Demining group] DT-01 on 7 July 
2007. On 25 August 2007 at 0905 hrs while [the Victim] a deminer of Party-01, Section-1 of 
the mentioned team was working in his clearance lane on a detected signal his bayonet 
stroke on top of an anti personnel PMN-2 mine; as a result the mine exploded and since 
helmet was not on his head, the victim deminer lost one eye, sustained serious injuries to 
other eye and some injuries to his face and hand with active bleeding. 
The casualty was first shifted to Eye Hospital, and after 20 minutes delay he was shifted to 
Emergency Hospital. After 30 minutes as per requirement he was shifted again to the Eyes 
Hospital, and as per recommendations of the doctors that there is possibility of losing his 
other eye, the casualty was shifted to Peshawar of Pakistan for more treatments. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
The following points were found by investigation team: 
• The loss of deminer’s one eye, serious injuries on  face and other eye; also not being 
any sign of explosion on the visor of the victim deminer reveal that helmet was not on 
his head, and that is why he sustained such serious injuries and loss of one eye.  
• Excavation drill was not practiced in accordance with SOP because the deminer 
without considering excavation safety distance and excavation depth has worked 
directly on centre of the located signal which shows lack of proper training for the 
team. 
• Team leader and  relevant section leader has failed to notify the deminer to wear  the 
visor, and not to practice such wrong excavation drill which shows lack of command 
and control in the team. 
• The team leader and relevant section leader claim that as a result of explosion the 
victim Deminer’s bayonet has been thrown away and has been missed, so the 
investigation team could not see the bayonet to find and see any sign of explosion on 
it. So they are not sure whether the victim deminer was using the bayonet or another 
tool for excavation of the reading. 
• The accident occurred at 09:05 am and the AMAC investigation team reached to the 
site at the same day at 10:45 am, but team all members had already left the site and 
hand tools of the victim deminer were also shifted from accident site to the team base 
camp. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS:  
The following points are to be considered: 
• Refresher training, focusing on excavation drills, is recommended to be conducted for 
the team. 
• The team command group has to strictly control the deminers to be dressed with PPE 
and their visors. 
• Command group should strictly control the deminers, do not permit practicing 
incorrect drill, and ensure that they are working in accordance with set procedures 
and NGO SOP. 
• [Demining group] field supervisor and OPS Officer are recommended to visit the 
teams’ worksites more frequently in order to identify operational failures in site and 
avoid their occurrence in future. 
• The team command group must not disturb the accident point, not to remove the 
accident involved equipment form site and remain at site till arrival of investigation 
team to the site.                                                                                                                                               
• As [Demining group] management did not take any disciplinary action on the previous 
demining accident which took place with the same team.  So it is recommended that 
the commend group of the team should be immediately demoted and qualified 
replacements should be appointed for the team. 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 959 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: severe Eye; severe Face; severe Hand 
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Eye  
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. ". . . the victim deminer lost one eye, 
sustained serious injuries to other eye and some injuries to his face and hand with active 
bleeding".  
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the 
investigators found that the field controllers had failed to correct the Victim’s errors and had 
removed evidence of the accident before the investigation, possibly to conceal the tool that 
was in use at the time. 
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The secondary cause is listed as Inadequate training because the investigators found that the 
deminers needed training in safe excavation drills as they appear in the demining group’s 
SOPs. Failure to provide effective training is also a significant Management Control 
Inadequacy. 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years, 
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have 
been more responsible over sharing data than those internationals who presume greater 
responsibility. 
 
4 
